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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3760-81/1
18 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. (U)

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 16 June 1981 with the A/NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. (U)

Attachment
NFAC #3760-81

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SECRET

SECRET

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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*

THE HORN OF AFRICA

Sporadic fighting along the Ethiopian-Somali border has resumed after a lull of several months. Ethiopian planes have carried out some raids inside Somalia, and there have been clashes on the ground. The Somalis seem intent on trying to keep any fighting inside Ethiopia, particularly those operations mounted by the Ethiopian-backed Somali Salvation Front (SSF). (S)

While there was general agreement that the Ethiopians are again intent on keeping up military pressure on the Siad government, there was some uncertainty as to whether this latest flare-up is merely a repeat of the kind of activity that we have traditionally seen or whether the Ethiopians have longer-term objectives in mind unrelated to the Ogaden situation as we know it. Most analysts believe we should now focus more intently on what the Ethiopians have in mind and look closely at events for signs of their intentions. The Community felt that the recent reports of a buildup of the SSF and the indication of the direct Soviet involvement with the group suggests that the SSF figures prominently in Mengistu's plans. It was also noted that the Somalis are still restrained by their relationship with the US in responding to Ethiopian military moves, and that if Ethiopian activity continues the US can expect more calls for military assistance. (S)

Now that fighting has resumed, the Community is again searching for signs of Somali regular units operating in the Ogaden, a key issue in US-Somali relations. Small groups of Somali regulars have been noted conducting reconnaissance activity in Ethiopia close to the border, and there is evidence a large unit engaged the Ethiopians in fighting at a location some 10 km inside the border. (S)

SUDAN

Concern surfaced about the durability of the Nimeiri government as Sudan enters its traditional long, hot summer. A number of disturbing developments have arisen that may test Nimeiri. A serious railroad workers strike is in progress, the economy is in serious shape, and there are indications that opposition groups have been in contact with the Libyans. There is also a threat of public disturbances similar to what occurred recently when a riot took place following a power failure at a Khartoum cinema. All of these by

*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

SECRET

SECRET

themselves would not be threatening, but collectively could be a challenge for Nimeiri. The military seem firmly behind Nimeiri. (S)

A new factor that bears watching is Nimeiri's closer identification with Sadat. There is a natural suspicion of Sudan's powerful neighbor to the north among many conservative Muslims and other Sudanese. This may account for the reports of conservatives listening to the Libyans. Another concern is the possibility that the economic situation can be exploited by outsiders. (S)

THE OAU

No one looked for solutions to the issues that will arise at the forthcoming OAU summit. Indeed, the feeling was expressed that the US would come under attack for our southern African policy, particularly Namibia. Analysts also noted that in his role as the OAU president for the coming year, Kenyan President Moi will have to balance his role as president with his close relations with the US and may make statements that appear to be out of line with Kenya's past moderate policies. Analysts were pessimistic that Qadhafi could be blocked from holding next year's summit in Libya. (S)

LIBYA-AFRICA

Concern was expressed over future French policy in Africa and that Qadhafi will be watching for opportunities to test the French presence in west and central Africa with offers of oil and money to local governments should he perceive France altering its relationships with the Francophones and other key African states. The Central African Republic, Niger and Zaire are likely targets. (S)

BENIN

It appears that the Soviets are about to begin work on improving and lengthening a key airfield in Benin. Work on the airfield has not yet started, however. When completed, the new airfield could make it easier for the Soviets to support their long-range flights to Angola. (S)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Community representatives believed that it was important to highlight the likelihood of increased and unexpected South African military strikes against the African states that border South Africa. This will greatly complicate US diplomacy in southern Africa and will afford the Soviets and other states hostile to the US countless opportunities to exploit South African military activity in order to link the US with any action the Pretoria government takes. (S)

A period of tense US relations with Zambia appears to be underway. Such periods have occurred before when Kaunda has been under stress, but a new and alarming factor has been added with the indication that surveillance of US diplomatic personnel was to be increased, particularly because of increased East German involvement with the Zambian security service. (S)

In Zaire, analysts are concerned about the unconfirmed reports that have been received over the past few months that indicate Soviet interest in and

SECRET

SECRET

promises of assistance to the ex-Katangans. We are uncertain how to evaluate the information in the absence of additional reporting from other sources.
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SECRET

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